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The western allies, especially Churchill, did not like what Stalin proposed and saw it as opportunistic. However, they reluctantly agreed to Stalin's demands as they needed to keep the alliance strong in order to decisively defeat the Third Reich. <ref>Roberts, Geoffrey, Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. (Yale University Press, Yale, 2006), p. 156</ref> In accordance with decisions taken at the Tehran Conference, in May 1944 joint Britain and US troops launched an invasion of France, opening the so-called “second front” in the West. Their actions allowed the Soviet Union to make significant advances across Eastern Europe toward Germany. In particular, they advanced upon the territories that they had lost during the German invasion. The end of the war was near and the changing geopolitical situation, especially in Europe meant that it was time for another meeting of the Allies. <ref> Roberts, p. 145</ref>

[[File: Yalta 1.jpg|thumbnail|300px|Soviet soldiers in Berlin in 1945]]

The Yalta Conference took place in February 1945. This was the second wartime meeting of the “Big Three” the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and US President Franklin Roosevelt). Each brought his own agenda to the Yalta Conference. The British wanted to maintain their empire, the Soviets wished to secure and obtain more land and secure positions in their new zones of influence and interests, and the US wanted to ensure the Soviet’s entry into the Pacific war and discuss postwar settlement.<ref> Geoffery Roberts, "Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences," Journal of Cold War Studies 9:4 (Fall 2007): 6-40</ref> From the very opening, Stalin made it clear that his demands regarding Poland were not negotiable: the Soviets were to gain “their territory” from the eastern portion of Poland. Poland was to compensate for that by extending its Western borders, thereby forcing out millions of Germans. Negotiators even signed a declaration forcing the Polish to provide inclusion of Soviet Communists in their postwar national government.<ref> Roberts, p. 245 </ref>